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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ect of oil price innovations on manufacturing job ows across U.S
states. First, I estimate a nonlinear structural equation model and compute impulse response
functions by Monte Carlo integration. I nd asymmetries in the responses of job ows to positive
and negative oil price innovations. Yet, these asymmetries do not pass a test of symmetry on
the impulse responses, especially after accounting for data mining. Third, I use a test for the
absence of job reallocation to evaluate whether an unexpected increase in the real price of oil
price triggers an important change in job reallocation. I nd that oil price shocks have limited
regional allocative e¤ects.
JEL Classication: E24, E32, Q43.
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1 Introduction
Di¤erences in unemployment rates across U.S. regions and states are well documented. For instance,
its well known that Texas tend to have an unemployment rate that is lower than the national
average whereas other states like Michigan often experience an unemployment rate that exceeds
the U.S. national unemployment rate. Yet, little is known about the fundamental labor dynamics
behind these di¤erences. Specically, little is known on how the number of jobs created and
destroyed by establishment responds to economic shocks.
In this paper, I study the e¤ect of oil price shocks on manufacturing job creation and job
destruction across U.S. states. Recently, Herrera and Karaki (2015) have examined the e¤ect of
oil price shocks on job ows in disaggregated manufacturing industries. While work by Herrera
and Karaki (2015) contributes to learning about U.S. business cycles, this study contributes to the
literature interested in studying regional U.S. business cycles. In particular, this paper investigates
the e¤ect of positive and negative oil price innovations on regional job ows and examines whether
positive oil price shocks trigger a signicant change in job reallocation.
After the 1970s stagation, economic research on the e¤ect of oil price shocks on economic
activity has surged. Many empirical papers found that positive oil price shocks are a major source
of economic uctuations whereas negative oil price shocks only generate mild and insignicant e¤ects
on output1. The view that positive and negative oil price innovations have asymmetric e¤ects on
U.S. economic activity have been reinforced using slope based test of symmetry (see Mork, Olsen,
and Mysen, 1994; Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia, 2003; Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2005).
Recently, Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a) hereafter KV (2011a) have questioned the consensus
reached in the early 2000s literature on the asymmetry in the relationship between oil prices and
output. They claim that previous empirical papers that rejected the null of symmetry in the
1See, e.g., Mork, 1989; Loungani, 1986; Davis, 1987a,b, Hooker, 1996.
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relationship between oil prices and the macroeconomy are based on censored VAR models. In their
paper, KV(2011a) explicitly demonstrate how these models can lead to biased and inconsistent
estimates, which often exaggerate the impact of oil prices on economic activity. They further
explain why the textbook orthogonalized impulse response functions (OIRF) heavily used in the
literature in forecasting the nonlinear impact of oil prices are not informative about the degree
of asymmetry in the response to an oil price shock, and emphasize the importance of computing
impulse response functions by Monte Carlo integration that account for the history and the size
of the shock (see Koop, Pesaran and Potter, 1996). In addition, KV (2011a) show that slope-
based tests cannot reveal whether the responses of economic activity to positive and negative oil
price shocks are symmetric. Instead, they propose a test of symmetry on the impulse response
functions and nd that the relationship between oil prices and GDP growth (or consumption and
unemployment rate) is well captured by a linear model. While there seems to be ample evidence in
the recent literature that the null of symmetry cannot be rejected using aggregate macroeconomic
variables, work by Herrera, Lagalo and Wada (2011) show that the null of symmetry is rejected for
some disaggregated industrial production indices.
In theory, oil price shocks a¤ect the macroeconomy through both direct and indirect supply
and demand channels (see Kilian, 2014). Direct channels imply symmetry in the response of
economic activity to positive and negative oil price innovations whereas indirect channels generate
amplications and asymmetry in the responses. By direct demand side e¤ects, I refer to the change
in purchasing power upon an oil price shock, which leads to a symmetric change in aggregate demand
(see Baumeister and Kilian, 2017; Baumeister, Kilian and Zhou, 2017). On the other hand, there
are indirect demand side e¤ects that generate asymmetries and amplication in the response of
output to an unexpected oil price shock due to increases in precautionary saving (see Edelstein
and Kilian, 2009) associated with heightened uncertainty (see Bernanke, 1983 and Pindyck, 1991)
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and a change in the composition of demand (see Ramey and Vine, 2012). For instance, an increase
or a decrease in the price of oil will increase uncertainty and push households to increase their
precautionary saving. As a result, regardless of the direction in the change of the price of oil,
consumption expenditure will decrease which will increase the adverse e¤ect associated with an oil
price increase and mitigate the benets associated with an oil price decline. By direct supply side
e¤ects, I refer to the change in the cost of production associated with oil price shocks, which leads
to a symmetric change in aggregate supply (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996). On the other
hand, I refer to the deployment of labor and capital across sectors (see Davis 1987a; Davis 1987b;
Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001; Hamilton, 1988) as the indirect supply side e¤ects that generate an
asymmetric impact on output and employment. The costly sectoral reallocation channel implies
that regardless of the sign of the oil price shock, resources will chose to relocate from most a¤ected
to least a¤ected sectors creating a mismatch in the labor market. This channel of transmission
will amplify the negative e¤ects associated with higher oil prices and reduce the positive e¤ects
generated with lower oil prices.
This paper has four main contributions. First unlike previous studies (e.g. Davis and Halti-
wanger, 2001, Herrera and Karaki, 2015; Herrera, Karaki and Rangaraju, 2017) that solely focused
on industry level data within the manufacturing sector, this study analyzes the e¤ect of oil price
shocks on manufacturing job ows across U.S. states. Studies that use disaggregated data by in-
dustry are often based on a small sample due to the change in the industry classication from SIC
to NAICS in the late 1990s. Using disaggregated data by state allow us to use a dataset that covers
a variety of oil price shock episodes including the recent oil price decline in 2014.
Second, I use a nonlinear structural model building on Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a) and Herrera
and Karaki (2015) methods that nest both symmetric and asymmetric e¤ects associated with the
transmission of oil prices to the economy, and compute impulse response functions by Monte Carlo
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integration to analyze the e¤ect of positive and negative oil price innovations on manufacturing
job creation and job destruction across U.S. states. Results show important heterogeneity in the
responses of job ows. In addition, I nd important asymmetries in the responses of job creation
and job destruction to positive and negative oil price innovations. A closer look at the 1-year
cumulative e¤ects reveal that the responses of job creation and job destruction to a negative oil
price shock are at least as large as the responses of job ows to a positive oil price shock.
Third, I evaluate whether the responses of job ows to positive and negative oil price shocks
are asymmetric by using a test of symmetry following KV (2011a) and Herrera and Karaki (2015).
Using conventional critical values, I nd no evidence against the null of symmetry for a 1 standard
deviation shock. For a 2 standard deviation shock, the null of symmetry is rejected for few states.
Yet, the evidence against the null of symmetry vanishes for all states after using data mining robust
critical values. This result is in line with Engemann, Owyang and Wall (2012) who nd no evidence
of asymmetry in the response of payroll employment across states to positive and negative oil price
shocks.
Fourth, while previous work by Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) and Herrera and Karaki (2015)
have studied whether oil price shocks operate through costly sectoral reallocation channels, this
paper investigates whether positive oil price shocks trigger signicant reallocation of jobs across
U.S. states. Investigating the transmission mechanism through which oil price shocks a¤ect regional
economies directly contributes to the literature interested in studying disparities and commonality
of regional U.S. business cycles (see Hamilton and Owyang, 2012; Engemann, Owyang and Wall,
2014; Karaki, 2017). To evaluate whether positive oil price shocks have a signicant e¤ect on
job reallocation, I follow Herrera and Karaki (2015) and implement a test of the absence of job
reallocation. I nd no evidence against the null of the absence of job reallocation for a shock of 1
standard deviation. I also nd that an unexpected positive oil price shock of 2 standard deviation
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has no e¤ect on job reallocation across all U.S. states especially after accounting for data mining.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data on regional job ows
and oil prices. I present the model in section 3 and discuss the computation of the impulse response
functions. Section 4 explores the empirical results. Section 5 conducts a test of symmetry à la KV
(2011a) to investigate whether the responses of job ows are symmetric to positive and negative oil
price innovations. Section 6 evaluates whether a positive oil price shock have signicant regional
allocative e¤ects. Section 7 concludes.
2 Job Creation, Job Destruction and Oil prices
I used two databases on quarterly state job ows data in the manufacturing sector to study
the e¤ect of oil prices on job creation and job destruction across U.S. states. For the 1972:Q2
to 1998:Q4 period, I obtain data from the Gross Job Flows database (1996, 2005) by Davis and
Haltiwanger and Shuh. For the 1999:Q1 to 2015:Q3, I use the Business Employment Dynamics
database from the Bureau of Labor Economics.
As dened by Davis and Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), job creation represents the sum of
employment gains at expanding and entering establishments and job destruction represents the
sum of employment losses at contracting and exiting establishments. These job ows measures
are computed as job creation and job destruction rates, POSt and NEGt. Following Davis and
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), I dene the net growth rate of employment for state j at time t as:
NETj;t = POSj;t  NEGj;t; (1)
and the job reallocation rate is dened as the sum of POSj;t and NEGj;t.
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SUMj;t = POSj;t +NEGj;t; (2)
As an indicator for labor market exibility I dene the excess job reallocation rate as:
EXCj;t = POSj;t   jNETj;tj : (3)
This measure of job reallocation portrays the amount of reallocation that would have been
necessary to o¤set the changes in net employment growth2.
Regarding the oil price measures, I compute nominal oil prices using the imported U.S. crude
oil reners acquisition cost reported by the Energy Information Agency. Then, I obtain the real oil
price by deating the nominal price of oil with the consumer price index (CPI). In the model section,
I dene xt as the percentage change in the real price of oil and x
#
t as a nonlinear transformation
of oil prices.
I use two di¤erent nonlinear transformations of the natural logarithm of the real oil price ot.
The rst measure is Morks (1989) oil price increase. This measure was motivated by Morks (1989)
claim that oil price increases lead to signicant economic downturns while decreases in oil prices
have no e¤ect on economic activity. This nonlinear transformation of oil prices sets the value of
x#t equal to zero for any period where the oil price change was negative:
x1t = max f0; ln (ot)  ln (ot 1)g : (4)
The second censored oil price measure used in our analysis is Hamilton net oil price increase
measure (Hamilton, 1996). This measure set x#t equal to zero for the oil price increases that does
2Note that the excess job reallocation rate is measure that is known for tracking exibility in the labor market
(see Micco and Pagés, 2004; Cuñat and Melitz 2012).
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not exceed the previous years maximum:
x4t = max f0; ln (ot) max f0; ln (ot 1) ; :::; ln (ot 4)gg : (5)
As suggested by Hamilton (1996, 2003) this nonlinear transformation of oil prices is known for
successfully capturing the nonlinear relationship between the price of oil price and U.S. aggregate
economic activity.
3 Model
To study the e¤ect of oil price shocks on job creation and job destruction I estimate the
following structural model using 4 quarterly lags:
xt = a10 +
pX
i=1
a11;ixt i +
pX
i=1
a12;iNEGS;t i +
pX
i=1
a13;iPOSS;t i + "1;t (6a)
NEGS;t = a20 +
pX
i=0
a21;ixt i +
pX
i=1
a22;iNEGS;t i +
pX
i=1
a23;iPOSS;t i +
pX
i=0
g21;ix
#
t i + "2;t (6b)
POSS;t = a30 +
pX
i=0
a31;ixt i +
pX
i=0
a32;iNEGS;t i +
pX
i=1
a33;iPOSS;t i +
pX
i=0
g31;ix
#
t i + "3;t (6c)
where xt stands for the percentage change in oil prices, x
#
t refers to any of the two nonlinear
transformation of oil prices dened in section 2, POSj;t is the job creation rate in the state j,
NEGj;t is the job destruction rate in state j, and "t = ["1;t; "2;t;"3;t] is a vector of contemporaneously
and serially uncorrelated innovations. I follow Herrera and Karaki (2015) and impose the following
identication restrictions. Oil prices are assumed to be predetermined to job destruction and job
creation. This assumption is consistent with work by Kilian and Vega (2011) who found that oil
prices do not respond contemporaneously to employment. I also assume that job destruction does
8
not respond contemporaneously to changes in job creation because of staggered labor contracts.
The model in 6(a)-6(c) can be estimated e¢ ciently by OLS. Given that the model is nonlinear in
xt, textbook impulse response functions will convey misleading information on the e¤ect of oil price
innovations (see Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen 1993 and Koop, Pesaran and Potter 1996, Kilian and
Vigfusson 2011a). Therefore, I compute impulse response functions by Monte Carlo integration
that account for the history and the size of the shock as follows:
1. I store the estimated coe¢ cients, standard errors and residuals obtained from estimating
model 6a-c by OLS.
2. I condition on a given history fxt 1; : : : ; xt p; NEGt 1; ..., NEGt p; POSt 1; ...,POSt pg =
fXt; Nt; Ptg 2 
t and I generate two time paths, for oil (xt), job destruction (NEGt) and
job creation (POSt). The rst path for xt (x1t ) is generated by tracing the response of xt to
an oil price innovation of size  (1 or 2 s.d.). The other time path for xt (x2t ) is generated by
tracing the response of xt to a shock "1t drawn from the empirical distribution of "1t.
3. The updated information sets along with the censored variables are I1t = f1; x1t ; Xt; Nt; Pt;
x1#t ; X
1#
t g and I2t = f1; x2t ; Xt; Nt; Pt; x2#t ; X2#t g. Given these two histories, two paths
for NEGt are generated. The rst time path for NEGt (NEG1t ) is generated by tracing the
response of NEGt to a shock "2t drawn from the empirical distribution of "2t and using the
information set I1t and the other time path for NEGt (NEG2t ) is obtained by tracing the
response of NEGt to a shock "2t drawn from the empirical distribution of "2t and using the
information set I2t .
4. The new updated information sets are now dened as eI1t = f1; x1t ; N1t ; Xt; Nt; Pt; x1#t ; X1#t g
and eI2t = f1; x2t ; N2t ; Xt; Nt; Pt; x2#t ; X2#t g: Given these two histories, two paths for POSt
are generated. The rst time path for POSt (POS1t ) is generated by tracing the response of
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POSt to a shock "3t drawn from the empirical distribution of "3t and using the information
set eI1t and the other time path for POSt (POS2t ) is obtained by tracing the response of POSt
to a shock "3t drawn from the empirical distribution of "3t and using the information set eI2t .
5. Step 2  4 are repeated for H + 1 times (where H = 12).
6. After R (I set R = 10; 000) replications of steps (2)-(4), I generate the conditional IRFs as
INEG
 
h; ;
t

=
1
R
RX
r=1
NEG1t;r  
1
R
RX
r=1
NEG2t;r for h = 0; 1; : : : ;H
and
IPOS
 
h; ;
t

=
1
R
RX
r=1
POS1t;r  
1
R
RX
r=1
POS2t;r for h = 0; 1; : : : ;H
7. The unconditional IRFs are generated by repeating (2) to (6) for all possible 
t, and then
taking the mean over all the histories.
INEG (h; ) =
Z
INEG
 
h; ;
t

d
t
and
IPOS (h; ) =
Z
IPOS
 
h; ;
t

d
t
We also follow the same approach for a negative shock  , to obtain the unconditional response
of job destruction, INEG (h; ), and the unconditional response for job creation, IPOS (h; ).
4 Impulse response functions and quantitative e¤ects
In this section, I compute the e¤ect of typical ( = 1 standard deviation) and large ( = 2 standard
deviation) oil price innovations on job ows across U.S. states. Even though its quite known that
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most oil price innovations, specically 2 third of the oil price innovations, have a magnitude of 1
standard deviation (see Kilian and Vigfusson, 2016), Hamilton (2009) argue that researchers are
often interested in the consequences of extraordinary events when they analyze the e¤ect of oil price
shocks. Therefore, despite the high uncertainty associated with estimating large oil price shocks, I
discuss in this section the e¤ect oil price shocks for two di¤erent magnitudes.
4.1 The e¤ect of a typical shock
Figure 1 (Figure 2) reects the responses of job creation (job destruction) to positive and negative
oil price innovations of 1 standard deviation (1 s.d.) using Mork (1989) oil price increase as a
nonlinear transformation for the real price of oil3. Results based on the net oil price increase
measure (see Hamilton, 1996) are reported in the online appendix. The 95% and 90% condence
bands are reports in squares and diamonds, respectively. To get a better grasp on whether the
responses of job creation (job destruction) are asymmetric to oil price shocks, I report the negative
of the response of job creation (job destruction) to a negative oil price shock.
Let us focus rst on the response of job creation. Figure 1 reveal that the response of job
creation to positive and negative oil price innovations is asymmetric for most states except for
Connecticut, Louisiana and Idaho. Table 2 reports the 1-year cumulative e¤ects of positive and
negative oil price innovations on job ows. Interestingly, I nd that in absolute terms the 1-year
cumulative response of job creation to a negative oil price shock is larger than the 1-year cumulative
response of job creation to a positive oil price shock for total manufacturing and 29 out of 40 U.S.
states. This nding indicates that job creation across states is more responsive to negative than to
positive oil price innovations4.
3The gures for the remaining states are available in the online appendix (see gure A.1a-c and gure A. 2a-c).
Note also that the impulse responses are similar to the responses based on the 1-year net oil price increase nonlinear
transformation of the real price of oil (see gure A.7a-c and gure A.8a-c of the online appendix).
4 I report the cumulative responses of job ows for the net oil price increase measure in the online appendix (see
table A.1).
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The e¤ect of oil price shocks on state job destruction rate is depicted in gure 2. These gures
portray important asymmetries in the response of job destruction to positive and negative oil price
innovations that greatly vary across states. For almost all states, the magnitude of this asymmetry
peaks within a year following an oil price shock. The 1-year cumulative response of job destruction
to a negative oil price shock is larger than the 1-year cumulative response of job destruction to a
positive oil price shock for total manufacturing and 32 out of 40 U.S. states. This nding indicates
that, similar to job creation, state-level job destruction responds more to negative and positive oil
price innovations.
How does the net employment change across states responds to positive and negative oil price
innovations of 1 standard deviation? Table 2 reveals that the 1-year cumulative e¤ect of a positive
oil price shock on net employment is negative for total manufacturing and 19 out of 40 states.
The most negatively a¤ected states with an unexpected oil price increase are Idaho and Michigan,
whereas states that tend to benet the most are Oklahoma and Texas. Interestingly, the e¤ect of
a negative oil price shock on net employment is negative for total manufacturing and 39 out of
40 states. In fact, for almost all states, a negative oil price innovation trigger a larger change in
net employment compared to a positive oil price innovation. These results indicate that reductions
in oil prices do not stimulate employment across states and reveal that net employment is more
a¤ected with negative than positive oil price innovations.
The response of job reallocation to oil price innovations di¤er greatly across states. The 1-year
cumulative e¤ect associated with a positive (negative) oil price shock on gross job reallocation is
0.47 (0.81) percentage points for Michigan and 1.79 (-1.33) percentage points for Nevada (see Table
2). Interestingly, the 1-year cumulative response of gross job reallocation and excess job reallocation
to a negative oil price shock is larger in absolute terms than the cumulative e¤ects triggered by a
positive oil price shock for more than half of the states that I study. Moreover, I nd that regardless
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of the oil price change direction, the 1-year cumulative response of the excess job reallocation rate
is negative for almost all U.S. states.
4.2 The e¤ect of a large oil price shock
How much larger is the response of job ows to oil price innovations of 2 standard deviations?
Figure 3 and Figure 4 reect the responses of job creation and job destruction to positive and
negative oil price innovations of 2 standard deviations. The reported results are based on the Mork
(1989) oil price increase nonlinear transformation for the real price of oil5.
The response of job creation to positive and negative oil price innovations reveal sharp asymme-
tries for (h < 4). As in the case for a 1 s.d. shock, the 1-year cumulative response of job creation to
a large shock is more responsive to a negative than a positive oil price shock for total manufacturing
and 29 out of 40 U.S. The 1-year cumulative response of job creation to a positive shock is negative
for 21 out of 40 states, whereas, the 1-year cumulative response of job creation to a negative shock
is negative for 38 out of 40 states.
The impulse response functions reported in Figure 5 reveal sharp asymmetries in the response
of job destruction rate to positive and negative oil price innovations. Table 3 reveals that the 1-year
cumulative response of job destruction to a negative oil price shock exceeds the 1-year cumulative
response of job destruction to a positive oil price shock for most states. More than that, for almost
all states the cumulative response of job destruction is positive for both positive and negative oil
price innovations. This result indicates that large oil price shocks, regardless of their sign, trigger
rms to shed more jobs across states.
The 1-year cumulative response of net employment to a negative oil price shock is negative
5Results for remaining states are available under the online appendix (see Figure A.3a-c and gure A.4a-c).
Figure A.9a-c and gure A.10a-c of the online appendix reveal that using the 1-year net oil price increase nonlinear
transformation of the real price of oil generate similar results. Note also that the cumulative e¤ects on job ows for
the net oil price increase measure are reported in Table A.2.
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for total manufacturing and all U.S. states. For a positive oil price shock, the 1-year cumulative
response of net employment is negative for total manufacturing and 25 out of 40 U.S. states.
Note that the 1-year cumulative change triggered by a negative oil price shock exceeds the 1-year
cumulative response of net employment following a positive oil price shock for almost all states.
These ndings indicate that both positive and negative oil price innovations have a negative e¤ect
on manufacturing net employment across states.
A large positive oil price shock triggers substantial changes in job reallocation across states.
Table 3 reects that following a positive (negative) oil price shock, the 1-year cumulative change in
gross job reallocation ranges between -1.82 (-2.04) and 4.27 (3.15) percentage points. For instance
following a positive (negative) oil price shock, the 1-year cumulative response of gross job realloca-
tion is 2.61 (3.15) percentage points for Michigan and 4.27 (-2.04). These e¤ects are almost three
times larger than the response of gross job reallocation to 1 standard deviation shock. Similarly,
Table 3 show important heterogeneity in the 1-year cumulative response of excess job reallocation
to large oil price shocks. For a positive (negative) oil price shock, the 1-year cumulative response of
excess job reallocation to a large shock is more than twice as large the 1-year cumulative response
of excess job reallocation for a 1 standard deviation shock for 20 (31) U.S. states.
5 Test of symmetry
Given the ample evidence in the previous section that oil price innovations trigger important asym-
metries in the response of job ows to positive and negative oil price innovations, in this section I
use a formal test of symmetry as in Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a) to evaluate whether the observed
asymmetries in the impulse response are signicant. The test of symmetry is based on the following
null hypothesis for job creation:
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Ho : IPOS (h; ) = IPOS (h; ) for h = 0; 1; 2; :::;H:
and similarly for job destruction:
Ho : INEG (h; ) = INEG (h; ) for h = 0; 1; 2; :::;H:
In addition I conduct the test of symmetry to evaluate whether net employment, job reallocation
and excess job reallocation respond asymmetrically to positive and negative oil price innovations:
Ho : INET (h; ) = INET (h; ) for h = 0; 1; 2; :::;H:
Ho : ISUM (h; ) = ISUM (h; ) for h = 0; 1; 2; :::;H:
Ho : IEXC (h; ) = IEXC (h; ) for h = 0; 1; 2; :::;H:
I set H = 4, to reduce the data mining problem associated with repeating the test across several
horizons. Table 4 reports the p-values for this test for both 1 s.d. and 2 s.d. shocks. For a typical
shock of 1 s.d, the null of symmetry in the response of job destruction to positive and negative
oil price innovations is only rejected for Georgia at the 5% level. The null of symmetry cannot be
rejected for job creation at the 5% level. For net employment, the null of symmetry is only rejected
for Georgia at the 5% level. Moreover, the null of symmetry cannot be rejected for both gross job
reallocation and excess job reallocation.
For a large shock of 2 s.d., the null of symmetry for job destruction is rejected for total manufac-
turing and few states (5 out of 40 states). The null of symmetry for job creation cannot be rejected
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neither total manufacturing nor for any U.S. states. For the net employment change, I reject the
null of symmetry for total manufacturing and 6 out of 40 states. For gross job reallocation, the
null of symmetry is rejected for 4 out of 40 states.
Given that I have conducted the same test of symmetry for di¤erent state-level job ows, a
common concern in this approach is that there is an element of data mining. To address this
concern I construct data mining robust critical values by simulating the null distribution of the
supremum of the bootstrap Wald test statistic for all U.S. states and for both x1t and x
4
t nonlinear
transformations for the real price of oil as in Herrera and Karaki (2015)6. Yet, after accounting for
data mining robust critical values, evidence against the null of symmetry vanishes7.
6 The allocative channel of oil price shocks
One main transmission mechanism through which oil price shocks operate is the costly reallocation
channel. This channel indicates that regardless of the direction of the oil price change, resources will
be relocated from industries that are damaged from the oil price change to industries that benet
from the change in the real price of oil. Because, I found no evidence that positive and negative oil
price innovations have asymmetric e¤ects on job ows, I focus here on the e¤ect of a positive oil
price shock on state-level job reallocation. In fact, because di¤erent states have a di¤erent mix of
industries, then one important investigation is to evaluate whether a positive oil price shock trigger
important rellocative e¤ects across U.S. states. Figure 5 and 6 report the response of job creation,
job destruction, gross job reallocation and excess job reallocation to a positive oil price shock for
a positive oil price shock of 1 s.d. and 2 s.d., respectively8. The impulse response functions reveal
6Work by Inoue and Kilian (2004) and Kilian and Vega (2011) explain in detail the e¤ect of data mining and
solutions for this problem.
7 I also obtain very similar results using the net oil price increase measure (see table A.3).
8The results for the remaining states are reported in the online appendix (see gure A.5a-c and gure A.6a-c).
Note also that the results based on the net oil price increase measure are reported in the online appendix (see gure
A.11a-c and gure A.12a-c).
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substantial di¤erences in the responses of job reallocation and excess job reallocation across U.S.
states and show that the largest change in the response of job reallocation occurs within a year
following an unexpected positive oil price innovation.
To evaluate whether an unexpected oil price increase trigger signicant changes in state-level
job reallocation, I implement the test for the absence of job reallocation by Herrera and Karaki
(2015) where:
Ho : INEG (h; ) + IPOS (h; ) = 0 for h = 0; 1; 2; :::;H:
the test is computed for H = 4 to reduce the data mining problem arising from repeatedly
applying the test for di¤erent horizons. The focus is mainly on the 4 quarters e¤ect given that
there is ample evidence that oil price shocks have their largest e¤ects 1-year after the shock9.
Table 5 reports the p   values for the test of the absence of job reallocation based on con-
ventional critical values for both 1 s.d. and 2 s.d. shocks. Table 5 reveals that, for a 1 standard
deviation oil price innovation, the null of the absence of job reallocation cannot be rejected for
total manufacturing and all U.S. states at the 10% signicance level. For a large shock, a 2.s.d.
oil price innovation, the e¤ect of oil price shocks on job reallocation is only signicant at the 10%
for Mississippi and Virginia. The null for the absence of job reallocation cannot be rejected for
any state after using data mining robust critical values. Note that results reported in the online
appendix also show that using the 1 year net oil price increase as a nonlinear transformation in
the real price of oil lead to very similar results10. These ndings indicate that oil price innovations
have almost no e¤ect on job reallocation across U.S. states, which indicates that oil price shocks
mainly operate through aggregate channels.
9 see Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), Lee and Ni (2002), Herrera and Karaki (2015).
10 see table A.4 of the online appendix.
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7 Conclusion
This paper studied the e¤ect of oil price innovations on manufacturing job ows across U.S. states.
Unlike previous studies that solely focused on industry level data and were based on a small dataset
due to the change in the industry classication from SIC to NAICS, this study is based on a larger
dataset on manufacturing state-level job creation and job destruction rates. The data set comprises
di¤erent periods of oil price uctuations including the recent oil price declines that started in 2014.
I used a structural equation model that nests both symmetric and asymmetric e¤ects of oil
price shocks on job creation and job destruction. I estimated the model by OLS and computed
impulse response functions by Monte Carlo integration that account for the history and the size
of the shock, to examine the dynamic e¤ect of oil price shocks on job ows. The IRFs reveal
important heterogeneity in the responses of job creation and job destruction across di¤erent states.
For instance following a positive oil price shock, the most a¤ected states are Idaho and Michigan,
whereas some states such as Oklahoma and Texas tend to benet from this shock. In addition,
the impulse response functions show important asymmetries to positive and negative oil price
innovations for both job creation and job destruction. To evaluate whether these asymmetries in
the impulse responses are signicant, I followed Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a) and conducted a test
of symmetry. Results reveal that for a typical shock, the null of symmetry is not rejected for all
state-level job creation and job destruction rates. Little evidence against the null of symmetry
is found for a large shock. Furthermore, all evidence of against the null of symmetry completely
vanishes after accounting for data mining.
To assess whether oil price shocks trigger important allocative e¤ects, I studied the e¤ect of
a positive oil price shock on job reallocation. By evaluating whether oil price shocks trigger a
reallocation of jobs across U.S. states, I directly contribute to the literature interested in studying
regional U.S. business cycles. I implemented a test for the absence of job reallocation following
18
Herrera and Karaki (2015) and found no evidence that an unexpected positive oil price shock has a
signicant e¤ect on job reallocation across U.S. states. These ndings are in line with Herrera and
Karaki (2015) who also found that oil price shocks mainly operate through aggregate channels.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for job ows
Sector POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Total manufacturing 4.51 8.91 -4.40 13.41 8.96
Alabama 7.64 3.81 3.83 11.45 7.08
Arkansas 7.92 4.60 3.32 12.53 7.96
Arizona 6.03 6.37 -0.34 12.40 8.75
California 5.96 5.20 0.76 11.15 9.37
Colorado 5.92 4.33 1.59 10.25 8.47
Connecticut 6.86 4.20 2.66 11.06 8.05
Florida 5.33 5.58 -0.25 10.91 9.00
Georgia 5.04 7.30 -2.26 12.34 10.04
Iowa 5.41 4.97 0.43 10.38 9.07
Idaho 6.72 5.00 1.71 11.72 9.30
Illinois 4.41 9.37 -4.96 13.77 8.70
Indiana 3.72 10.98 -7.26 14.70 7.42
Kansas 5.70 8.34 -2.65 14.04 11.10
Kentucky 7.91 5.13 2.78 13.03 9.95
Louisiana 5.93 6.66 -0.73 12.59 10.33
Massachusetts 6.68 6.31 0.37 12.99 11.74
Maryland 7.19 5.11 2.07 12.30 10.15
Maine 6.65 4.92 1.74 11.57 9.35
Michigan 5.47 7.00 -1.52 12.47 10.16
Minnesota 5.74 6.30 -0.56 12.04 10.79
Missouri 6.06 5.01 1.05 11.07 9.66
Mississippi 6.37 4.65 1.72 11.03 8.91
Montana 5.46 5.56 -0.11 11.02 9.15
North Carolina 5.55 5.79 -0.23 11.34 10.16
Nebraska 6.08 3.95 2.13 10.03 7.83
New Hampshire 5.67 4.14 1.53 9.81 7.89
New Jersey 5.37 4.48 0.90 9.85 7.94
Nevada 5.14 6.00 -0.86 11.14 9.73
New York 4.45 3.62 0.84 8.07 6.99
Ohio 4.99 4.53 0.47 9.52 7.13
Oklahoma 4.45 5.23 -0.78 9.68 7.92
Oregon 4.81 6.87 -2.06 11.68 9.50
Pennsylvania 4.15 7.98 -3.82 12.13 8.17
South Carolina 5.26 6.58 -1.33 11.84 9.27
Tennessee 6.00 5.03 0.97 11.03 8.61
Texas 4.82 7.07 -2.25 11.88 9.21
Utah 4.89 5.50 -0.61 10.40 8.84
Virginia 4.95 5.14 -0.19 10.09 7.94
Washington 3.89 7.40 -3.51 11.30 7.79
Wisconsin 4.18 9.80 -5.63 13.98 8.23
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Table 2: Cumulative e¤ects of oil price innovations of 1 s.d. (x#t = x
1
t )
Positive shock Negative shock
sector POS NEG NET SUM EXC POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Total manufacturing 0.10 0.12 -0.02 0.22 -0.16 -0.15 0.38 -0.53 0.23 -0.37
Alabama -0.01 0.05 -0.06 0.04 -0.45 -0.12 0.44 -0.56 0.33 -0.34
Arkansas -0.09 -0.39 0.30 -0.48 -1.11 -0.06 0.54 -0.60 0.48 -0.17
Arizona 0.18 -0.40 0.59 -0.22 -1.12 -0.41 0.83 -1.24 0.42 -0.85
California 0.43 -0.11 0.54 0.33 -0.28 -0.63 0.32 -0.95 -0.31 -1.27
Colorado 0.32 -0.22 0.54 0.09 -0.80 -0.62 0.65 -1.28 0.03 -1.28
Connecticut 0.43 -0.18 0.61 0.25 -0.47 -0.46 0.55 -1.01 0.09 -0.93
Florida 0.31 0.13 0.18 0.43 -0.11 -0.45 0.35 -0.80 -0.10 -0.95
Georgia 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.51 -0.14 0.55 -0.69 0.41 -0.35
Iowa -0.23 -0.72 0.49 -0.95 -2.04 0.11 0.92 -0.81 1.03 0.14
Idaho -0.80 0.29 -1.09 -0.50 -1.94 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.23 -1.71
Illinois 0.09 0.14 -0.05 0.24 -0.25 -0.20 0.33 -0.54 0.13 -0.50
Indiana -0.13 0.25 -0.38 0.12 -0.64 0.05 0.40 -0.35 0.45 -0.58
Kansas -0.51 -0.12 -0.39 -0.63 -1.55 0.22 0.50 -0.28 0.73 0.00
Kentucky 0.00 0.12 -0.12 0.12 -0.17 -0.18 0.24 -0.42 0.06 -0.41
Louisiana 0.54 0.11 0.43 0.66 -0.17 -0.58 0.23 -0.81 -0.34 -1.20
Massachusetts 0.37 -0.18 0.55 0.18 -0.42 -0.43 0.64 -1.07 0.21 -0.87
Maryland -0.15 -0.22 0.07 -0.37 -0.84 0.01 0.21 -0.20 0.21 -0.19
Maine -0.07 0.10 -0.17 0.02 -0.80 -0.29 0.43 -0.72 0.14 -1.19
Michigan -0.23 0.70 -0.92 0.47 -0.62 0.19 0.62 -0.43 0.81 -0.97
Minnesota 0.33 0.08 0.25 0.41 -0.14 -0.45 0.22 -0.67 -0.23 -1.03
Missouri 0.10 -0.01 0.11 0.09 -0.24 -0.26 0.64 -0.90 0.39 -0.53
Mississippi -0.07 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.63 0.02 0.29 -0.26 0.31 -0.21
Montana -0.25 0.36 -0.61 0.12 -2.21 -0.01 -0.20 0.20 -0.21 -1.28
North Carolina -0.18 -0.14 -0.03 -0.32 -0.77 0.02 0.53 -0.52 0.55 -0.08
Nebraska 0.44 0.22 0.22 0.65 -0.07 -0.76 -0.06 -0.70 -0.82 -1.58
New Hampshire 0.36 -0.25 0.62 0.11 -0.51 -0.63 0.62 -1.24 -0.01 -1.26
New Jersey 0.13 -0.16 0.29 -0.03 -0.49 -0.30 0.38 -0.68 0.09 -0.60
Nevada 0.79 1.00 -0.21 1.79 0.78 -0.99 -0.34 -0.66 -1.33 -2.60
New York 0.48 0.04 0.44 0.52 -0.06 -0.56 0.31 -0.87 -0.25 -1.13
Ohio 0.02 0.11 -0.09 0.13 -0.40 -0.09 0.59 -0.67 0.50 -0.59
Oklahoma 0.55 -0.60 1.15 -0.04 -1.36 -0.71 1.33 -2.03 0.62 -1.44
Oregon 0.21 0.27 -0.06 0.48 -0.75 -0.29 0.21 -0.50 -0.08 -1.18
Pennsylvania 0.14 -0.15 0.29 0.00 -0.51 -0.19 0.49 -0.68 0.31 -0.43
South Carolina 0.06 -0.45 0.50 -0.39 -1.04 -0.22 0.75 -0.97 0.54 -0.45
Tennessee 0.07 0.18 -0.12 0.25 -0.26 -0.20 0.35 -0.55 0.15 -0.51
Texas 0.38 -0.54 0.92 -0.17 -1.09 -0.52 0.85 -1.37 0.33 -1.04
Utah 0.07 0.37 -0.30 0.44 -0.99 -0.40 -0.04 -0.36 -0.44 -1.51
Virginia -0.13 -0.07 -0.06 -0.20 -0.71 0.05 0.39 -0.34 0.44 -0.08
Washington 0.32 0.07 0.25 0.39 -0.57 -0.65 0.28 -0.93 -0.36 -1.43
Wisconsin -0.01 0.17 -0.19 0.16 -0.50 -0.06 0.26 -0.32 0.20 -0.44
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Table 3: Cumulative e¤ects of oil price innovations of 2 s.d. (x#t = x
1
t )
Positive shock Negative shock
sector POS NEG NET SUM EXC POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Total manufacturing 0.14 0.88 -0.75 1.02 0.15 -0.36 1.34 -1.71 0.98 -0.73
Alabama -0.18 0.72 -0.91 0.54 -0.54 -0.39 1.47 -1.86 1.08 -0.79
Arkansas -0.38 -0.58 0.20 -0.95 -2.31 -0.30 1.26 -1.55 0.96 -0.59
Arizona 0.04 -0.22 0.26 -0.17 -2.22 -1.12 2.22 -3.34 1.09 -2.25
California 0.57 0.08 0.49 0.66 -0.41 -1.54 0.91 -2.45 -0.62 -3.07
Colorado 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.32 -1.76 -1.65 1.82 -3.47 0.17 -3.30
Connecticut 0.81 0.12 0.70 0.93 -0.41 -0.96 1.54 -2.50 0.58 -1.92
Florida 0.41 0.90 -0.49 1.32 0.34 -1.08 1.30 -2.38 0.21 -2.17
Georgia -0.21 0.73 -0.93 0.52 -0.86 -0.47 1.81 -2.28 1.34 -0.94
Iowa -0.62 -1.20 0.58 -1.82 -4.53 0.07 2.08 -2.01 2.15 0.14
Idaho -2.44 1.05 -3.49 -1.38 -4.90 -0.41 0.53 -0.94 0.12 -4.65
Illinois 0.04 0.93 -0.89 0.96 -0.33 -0.54 1.27 -1.81 0.72 -1.09
Indiana -0.37 1.35 -1.72 0.98 -0.83 -0.01 1.57 -1.58 1.56 -1.05
Kansas -1.39 0.26 -1.64 -1.13 -3.84 0.11 1.46 -1.36 1.57 -0.29
Kentucky -0.24 0.71 -0.95 0.46 -0.51 -0.59 0.91 -1.50 0.32 -1.18
Louisiana 1.04 0.68 0.36 1.72 -0.43 -1.20 0.88 -2.08 -0.32 -2.40
Massachusetts 0.64 0.24 0.40 0.88 0.03 -0.95 1.83 -2.78 0.88 -1.90
Maryland -0.49 -0.46 -0.03 -0.95 -2.06 -0.16 0.39 -0.56 0.23 -0.64
Maine -0.58 0.82 -1.40 0.24 -2.22 -0.98 1.45 -2.43 0.46 -3.50
Michigan -0.51 3.12 -3.64 2.61 -1.07 0.32 2.83 -2.51 3.15 -2.43
Minnesota 0.50 0.57 -0.07 1.06 0.32 -1.05 0.83 -1.88 -0.23 -2.16
Missouri -0.01 0.81 -0.82 0.80 -0.19 -0.71 2.05 -2.76 1.34 -1.42
Mississippi -0.21 0.47 -0.68 0.27 -1.21 -0.01 0.96 -0.98 0.95 -0.39
Montana -0.87 0.94 -1.80 0.07 -6.74 -0.37 -0.21 -0.15 -0.58 -2.14
North Carolina -0.59 0.27 -0.85 -0.32 -1.30 -0.18 1.58 -1.76 1.39 -0.37
Nebraska 0.45 0.63 -0.18 1.08 -1.08 -1.92 0.07 -1.99 -1.84 -3.85
New Hampshire 0.39 -0.04 0.43 0.34 -0.28 -1.57 1.66 -3.22 0.09 -3.13
New Jersey 0.06 -0.06 0.12 0.00 -1.00 -0.78 1.01 -1.79 0.22 -1.57
Nevada 1.29 2.98 -1.69 4.27 2.00 -2.26 0.22 -2.48 -2.04 -5.25
New York 0.86 0.56 0.30 1.42 0.22 -1.22 1.07 -2.28 -0.15 -2.44
Ohio -0.06 1.13 -1.19 1.07 -0.28 -0.26 2.01 -2.27 1.75 -1.44
Oklahoma 0.89 -0.17 1.06 0.72 -1.62 -1.61 3.59 -5.20 1.98 -3.22
Oregon 0.30 1.26 -0.95 1.56 -1.62 -0.69 1.07 -1.76 0.38 -1.89
Pennsylvania 0.22 0.17 0.05 0.38 -0.46 -0.43 1.41 -1.85 0.98 -0.87
South Carolina -0.13 -0.44 0.31 -0.57 -1.68 -0.65 1.92 -2.57 1.27 -1.31
Tennessee -0.04 1.06 -1.11 1.02 -0.29 -0.57 1.35 -1.91 0.78 -1.14
Texas 0.55 -0.65 1.21 -0.10 -1.40 -1.22 2.10 -3.33 0.88 -2.45
Utah -0.30 1.19 -1.50 0.89 -2.47 -1.22 0.34 -1.56 -0.88 -2.84
Virginia -0.37 0.28 -0.66 -0.09 -1.19 0.00 1.17 -1.18 1.17 -0.06
Washington 0.18 0.66 -0.48 0.83 -1.65 -1.73 1.06 -2.79 -0.66 -3.46
Wisconsin -0.13 0.92 -1.05 0.79 -1.10 -0.22 1.06 -1.28 0.84 -0.78
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Table 4: Test of symmetry for positive and negative oil price innovations (x#t = x
1
t )
typical shock 1 s.d. large shock 2 s.d.
Sector POS NEG NET SUM EXC POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Total manufacturing 0.58 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.31 0.55 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.65
Alabama 0.73 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.50 0.70 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.66
Arkansas 0.89 0.66 0.68 0.82 0.43 0.88 0.63 0.66 0.81 0.69
Arizona 0.34 0.23 0.46 0.16 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.41 0.08 0.09
California 0.54 0.86 0.57 0.97 0.18 0.41 0.86 0.54 0.97 0.39
Colorado 0.25 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01
Connecticut 0.90 0.30 0.37 0.57 0.19 0.90 0.22 0.30 0.51 0.63
Florida 0.89 0.25 0.39 0.45 0.41 0.87 0.21 0.33 0.42 0.80
Georgia 0.84 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.39 0.81 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.57
Iowa 0.68 0.60 0.49 0.85 0.10 0.65 0.53 0.42 0.84 0.18
Idaho 0.18 0.91 0.25 0.49 0.04 0.05 0.91 0.12 0.36 0.05
Illinois 0.46 0.16 0.18 0.42 0.61 0.38 0.10 0.08 0.41 0.48
Indiana 0.54 0.31 0.21 0.53 0.31 0.43 0.26 0.12 0.52 0.71
Kansas 0.48 0.38 0.37 0.58 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.53 0.36
Kentucky 0.84 0.38 0.51 0.50 0.89 0.82 0.39 0.52 0.50 0.85
Louisiana 0.99 0.23 0.23 0.44 0.12 0.99 0.16 0.15 0.40 0.26
Massachusetts 0.35 0.59 0.31 0.71 0.32 0.23 0.54 0.20 0.69 0.50
Maryland 0.56 0.68 0.94 0.27 0.47 0.51 0.66 0.95 0.18 0.33
Maine 0.27 0.28 0.09 0.98 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.03 0.98 0.32
Michigan 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.51 0.44 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.41 0.41
Minnesota 0.96 0.89 0.78 0.98 0.51 0.95 0.88 0.76 0.98 0.84
Missouri 0.41 0.16 0.11 0.27 0.43 0.31 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.39
Mississippi 0.41 0.15 0.42 0.06 0.56 0.24 0.09 0.36 0.01 0.19
Montana 0.68 0.27 0.25 0.75 0.15 0.58 0.10 0.09 0.70 0.23
North Carolina 0.54 0.40 0.40 0.55 0.44 0.45 0.34 0.35 0.50 0.54
Nebraska 0.88 0.26 0.33 0.56 0.35 0.88 0.20 0.29 0.50 0.41
New Hampshire 0.65 0.84 0.62 0.91 0.19 0.59 0.84 0.60 0.91 0.36
New Jersey 0.43 0.71 0.59 0.50 0.11 0.35 0.72 0.58 0.44 0.10
Nevada 0.39 0.80 0.79 0.44 0.43 0.25 0.77 0.77 0.30 0.28
New York 0.69 0.50 0.43 0.66 0.28 0.64 0.42 0.32 0.63 0.46
Ohio 0.27 0.10 0.07 0.26 0.51 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.20 0.76
Oklahoma 0.76 0.11 0.24 0.20 0.00 0.73 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.07
Oregon 0.92 0.39 0.55 0.39 0.34 0.91 0.28 0.46 0.26 0.38
Pennsylvania 0.33 0.62 0.68 0.47 0.51 0.22 0.60 0.66 0.42 0.44
South Carolina 0.62 0.70 0.57 0.88 0.07 0.49 0.66 0.48 0.88 0.45
Tennessee 0.85 0.17 0.27 0.44 0.72 0.84 0.13 0.18 0.43 0.77
Texas 0.47 0.68 0.77 0.68 0.10 0.39 0.66 0.75 0.67 0.13
Utah 0.37 0.29 0.77 0.10 0.11 0.30 0.24 0.76 0.04 0.17
Virginia 0.42 0.21 0.44 0.15 0.45 0.21 0.14 0.40 0.04 0.30
Washington 0.54 0.38 0.27 0.91 0.18 0.45 0.32 0.17 0.89 0.41
Wisconsin 0.42 0.72 0.52 0.83 0.70 0.37 0.72 0.51 0.81 0.68
Notes: Computations are based on 10,000 simulations of model (6a-c). p-values are based on the 2H+1.
Bold and italics refer to signicance at the 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively. ** and * denote
signicance after accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Test for the absence of job reallocation (x#t = x
1
t )
sector typical shock 1 s.d. large shock 2 s.d.
Total manufacturing 0.81 0.76
Alabama 0.69 0.42
Arkansas 0.89 0.88
Arizona 0.56 0.24
California 0.91 0.93
Colorado 0.52 0.18
Connecticut 0.97 0.92
Florida 0.83 0.71
Georgia 0.93 0.79
Iowa 0.42 0.70
Idaho 0.42 0.44
Illinois 0.70 0.50
Indiana 0.66 0.75
Kansas 0.50 0.54
Kentucky 0.91 0.79
Louisiana 0.48 0.47
Massachusetts 0.93 0.93
Maryland 0.50 0.44
Maine 0.80 0.86
Michigan 0.90 0.76
Minnesota 0.97 0.98
Missouri 0.27 0.37
Mississippi 0.42 0.10
Montana 0.75 0.67
North Carolina 0.63 0.70
Nebraska 0.77 0.74
New Hampshire 0.48 0.74
New Jersey 0.58 0.52
Nevada 0.40 0.50
New York 0.38 0.44
Ohio 0.54 0.61
Oklahoma 0.24 0.12
Oregon 0.41 0.24
Pennsylvania 0.94 0.81
South Carolina 0.81 0.96
Tennessee 0.77 0.76
Texas 0.45 0.45
Utah 0.71 0.40
Virginia 0.15 0.07
Washington 0.79 0.80
Wisconsin 0.57 0.62
Notes: Computations are based on 10,000 simulations of model (6a-c). p-values are based on the 2H+1.
Bold and italics refer to signicance at the 5% and 10% signicance level, respectively. ** and * denote
signicance after accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 1: The responses of job creation to positive and negative oil price shocks of 1 s.d. (x
t
#
 = x
t
1
)
Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Computations are based on 10,000 simulations.
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Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Computations are based on 10,000 simulations.
Figure 2: The responses of job destruction to positive and negative oil price shocks of 1 s.d. (x
t
#
 = x
t
1
)
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Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Computations are based on 10,000 simulations.
Figure 3: The responses of job creation to positive and negative oil price shocks of 2 s.d. (x
t
#
 = x
t
1
)
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Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Computations are based on 10,000 simulations.
Figure 4: The responses of job destruction to positive and negative oil price shocks of 2 s.d. (x
t
#
 = x
t
1
)
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Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Computations are based on 10,000 simulations.
Figure 5: The responses of job flows to a positive oil price shock of 1 s.d. (x
t
#
 = x
t
1
)
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Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Computations are based on 10,000 simulations.
Figure 6: The responses of job flows to a positive oil price shock of 2 s.d. (x
t
#
 = x
t
1
)
